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2
3This paper deals with Euro introduction and ask whether it is likely to increase the exchange
rates volatility on a world-wide scale. Following this purpose, we present a three country-model (US,
Germany and France) and compare the exchange rate volatility according to the nature of the shock
(demand or supply shock) and to the exchange rate regime in Europe (flexible, EMS or EMU). Each
country is represented by two authorities: a central bank and a government (a single central bank
and two governments in Europe in the case of EMU). Within this framework, we compute Nash-
equilibria.
In theory, the exchange rate of a large closed country fluctuates more than the exchange rate of a
small open country (the size effect), but results are ambiguous in the specific case of the Euro. An
increase in volatility would only occur after demand and external supply shocks. Volatility would be
reduced following internal supply shocks. The conclusions are the opposite if the sensitivity of intra-
European trade to relative prices is particularly strong. In the case of common shocks in Europe, the
excess of volatility would help economic stabilisation. As for asymmetric shocks (hitting only one
country), the Euro would fluctuate less than the currency of the hit country in the previous monetary
system (EMS), but this stability would harm economic stabilisation, as loss functions show.
We note also that the independence of the ECB could lead to strong variations of the Euro after
inflationary shocks if the ECB and European governments do not share the same inflation target. The
constraints on fiscal policies which are induced by the Stability pact could make more active
monetary policies necessary: these would be a source of instability for the Euro.
JEL Classification : F330, F420
4
5Discussing Euro volatility
Jérôme CREEL and Henri STERDYNIAK v
The introduction of the Euro will be such an innovation that it should
substantially change the way the international monetary system works. The GDP of
the forthcoming eleven countries of the Euroland will be worth 80% of the US one
and double the Japanese one. Their degree of openness will represent 14 % of their
GDP, when France’s or Germany’s were up 23 %, and 28 % as a European mean (see
table 1).
Organisation and interactions between monetary and fiscal policies have long
been the subject of an abundant literature: internal European relationships as well as
external links with the US or Japan gave rise to numerous studies. Two topics have
recently emerged: the valuation of the future Euro’s exchange rate - the strong or
weak currency question - and that currency variability. We shall be dealing here
with this second issue: will the creation of the Euro contribute to increase world-
wide exchange rate volatility? Usually, economists expect that the European Central
Bank (ECB) will manage the Euro in order to pursue domestic goals, especially to
fight inflation, and will not therefore give much attention to the external stability of
the currency. Hence, skeptics fear that the Euro may be extremely volatile: the three
areas (surrounding respectively the US, Europe and Japan) would undergo large
fluctuations of the exchange rates, and these would increase global uncertainty and
be unfavourable to the growth of international trade1. Some recent papers2 reach the
opposite conclusion: we believe that this major topic deserves an assessment.
                                            
v This paper was presented during the Journees Internationales d’Economie Monetaire et Bancaire in
Toulouse, France, June 1998. We thank participants for their remarks and especially Agnes Benassy.
1 How exchange rate volatility impinges on international trade is discussed in IMF (1984) and Krugman
(1989).
2 Artus (1997, a and b), Benassy et al. (1997), Cohen (1997), Martin (1997).
61. Degree of openness in 1996*
in % of GDP
Importations Exportations
USA 13.0 11.4
Japan 9.4 10.0
Germany 24.2 23.0
France 21.4 24.0
Euroland 11 27.3 29.8
Euro 11 (intra-area trade
excluded)
13.4 14.4
* trade on goods and services.
Source : OECD, authors’ calculations.
In the economic literature, six different factors might increase or decrease the
Euro-Dollar exchange rate volatility in comparison with the present volatility of
European currencies. It is nevertheless difficult to compute the relative weights of
these factors.
The first one is the pure size effect, hence linked in part to the degree of
openness. The Euroland will be much less open to international trade than each of
the countries that will constitute it. A large and relatively closed country can use its
interest rate to stabilise the activity level or inflation ; it does not have to worry about
the consequences of its choices on the exchange rate; to a certain extent, exchange
rate fluctuations are painless and can be disregarded. On the contrary, a small open
country will be more concerned with the stability of the exchange rate in order to
avoid inflationary shocks (in case of a depreciation) or trade shocks (in case of an
appreciation). Euro’s introduction would then entail large fluctuations between the
dollar and the Euro because Central bankers or governments would disregard
exchange rate stability.
The second is linked to the automatic co-operation effect which occurs after a
symmetric shock (hitting homogeneously all EU countries). In such a situation, the
ECB will not react as national central banks would do in a flexible exchange rate
regime because the ECB knows that its action will impinge on EU as a whole,
whereas each national central bank could think, which would be misleading, that it
is the sole bank running an economic policy. After a common inflationary shock, the
ECB will increase the interest rate less than a national central bank would do since
an appreciation of the Euro will have less disinflationary effects in the EU than an
increase of the mark had on the German inflation. Being conscious of this effect may
limit the use of monetary policy: it would be an argument in favour of stability.
7The third comes from the uniqueness of the nominal interest rate in the EU: both
in case of an asymmetric shock or if EU countries cope with different economic
conditions, the European monetary policy will be limited. ECB’s monetary
impotence in this context would be another reason for exchange rate stability.
Further, it should be reminded that EMU take the place of an asymmetric fixed
exchange rate regime, the EMS. Following an idiosyncratic shock, the ECB will react
according to the average European economic situation, whereas the Bundesbank’s
behaviour was only taking the German situation into account. Hence, EMU will be
more stable than EMS if idiosyncratic shocks hit especially Germany, but less stable
if shocks mainly occur outside Germany. On the contrary, if shocks are symmetric,
the ECB should have the same behaviour as the Bundesbank’s, at least if the latter
was conscious that the other European central banks were following its policy to
stabilise their exchange rate with the DM3. In this case, Euro’s volatility will be the
same as that of hard EMS currencies: an increase in volatility should have already
been observed during the EMS.
EMU does not have size effects only; it is also characterised by a new type of
European economic policies’ organisation. The central bank independence
introduces risks of conflict between monetary and fiscal policies. If it occurs, it will
drive up both interest rates and Euro’s exchange rate; these risks are a source of
instability.
In order to circumvent those risks, the Stability Pact imposes strong restrictions
on fiscal policies and leaves the field open to monetary policy. The sole use of
monetary policy should necessitate large swings of the European interest rate after a
demand shock. This would be another source of instability for the Euro. A contrario,
after an inflation shock, the Stability Pact would prevent bad strategies, such as a
very restrictive monetary policy associated with a lax fiscal policy; the Pact would
then reduce volatility.
Last, the link between the variability of the exchange rate and the
macroeconomic stabilisation effect of economic policies need an assessment. In some
cases where countries face different economic situations, a large volatility makes
economic stabilisation better; in other cases, it reflects bad policies: governments
and/or central bankers try to export unemployment or inflation towards their trade
and financial partners, in pure vain. We shall now study in more details those
different elements; for this purpose, we use two models: first, we analyse the
situation of one country in the open economy; second, we use a three-country model
in which two of them are linked by an exchange rate agreement4.
                                            
3 See Sterdyniak and Villa (1993, a).
4 We present empirical evaluations of some currencies’ volatility between 1973 and 1997 in the appendix.
They confirm that volatility is higher the bigger the countries.
8Size and volatility
We use here a simple model to describe the short run equilibrium of a country in
the world economy (see box 1). This model is of the Keynesian type: wages are
sticky, production is kept in line with demand. Shocks are perceived by markets as
temporary. The model respects uncovered interest rate parity. The country we
consider may be small and open (the degree of openness n is 0.2), or large and closed
(n is 0.1). Policymakers in this country can manage two instruments: public
expenditures and the nominal interest rate. For a given increase in production, fiscal
policy is more inflationary in the large than in the small country, but trade deficit is
smaller (see table B1). As for monetary policy, it is less inflationary in the big
country, but it improves trade balance less.
After a shock has occurred, both authorities minimise a loss function which
depends on the social planners’ willingness to maintain economic activity, curb
inflation, or fight against trade deficit, taking into account their relative preferences
for each target and their point of view on the functioning of the economy . We will
distinguish the case in which both policymakers use fiscal and monetary policies
simultaneously from the situation in which they use monetary policy only, either
because of the existence of limits on fiscal policy (Stability Pact), or because the latter
is less efficient on the overall economic situation (because of long implementation
delays, possible irreversibility).
First, we consider the pure size effect. With our model, the more closed a
country, the more its exchange rate varies after a shock5. As a matter of fact, the
impact of exchange rate variations on output, inflation or trade balance depends on n
s, where s is the nominal exchange rate and n is the degree of openness. After a
shock, policymakers will move s the more, the less n, i.e. the more open the
economy6.
                                            
5 Box 2 gives explicit solutions for a simplified version of our model.
6 Artus (1997, a, b) finds the same result. Unfortunately, in his first paper, the model is inconsistent: first,
the exchange rate level depends on money supply whereas the central banker manages the interest rate; second,
the influence of the degree of openness is taken into account in the inflation equation but not in the trade
balance’s. In his second paper, Artus introduces in an arbitrary manner a modification in the Fed’s loss
function after the Euro has been created: no rigourous comparison can be elaborated in this context.
9Box 1: A simple model for a country in the open economy
The economy is described by the following six equations:
(1) Demand : y d g cy r b= + + - +s   with s = 025.  ; c= 05.
(2) Trade balance: b n y y n p s p= - + + -( * ) ( * )d  with n or= 01 02. . ; d = 15.
(3) Production prices: p vy w= +  with v= 025.
(4) Consumer prices: q n p s n p= + + -( * ) ( )1
(5) Interest rate parity: s r r= -*
(6) Loss function: L y q b= + +2 2 2a b  with a b= =2 3;
The model is a short term one. Output is driven by the level of demand. Wages are supposed to
be sticky. d and w represent demand and supply shock respectively. Economic agents forecast that
these shocks are temporary and that the exchange rate will return to its initial value after one period.
The degree of openness n can be equal to 0.1 (relatively large and closed country) or 0.2 (relatively
small and open country). An increase in the nominal exchange rate, s, is a depreciation of the
currency. Other variables have the standard meaning.
Table B1 sums up the impacts of both economic instruments. Fiscal policy’s impact is higher the
larger the country (the weaker the external constraint). Monetary policy’s impact is greater the
smaller the country (the larger the competitive gains from a depreciation).
Policymakers use their instruments in order to minimise their loss function. They manage public
expenditures g so that :
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Their actions depend on their relative reluctance towards inflation and trade imbalance
(summing up in a and b) and on their perception of the national macroeconomic functioning
(summing up in 
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In the case of a large country, policymakers do use g and the interest rate r so that at stationary
state:
1569 2 0353 3 0216 0
0627 2 0241 3 0064 0
. * . * * .
. * . * * .
y q b for g
y q b for r
+ - =
+ + =
B1. Impacts of economic policy’s instruments
Large country n = 0.1 Small country n = 0.2
g = 1 r = 1 g = 1 r = 1
y 1.569 – 0.627 1.290 – 0.710
q 0.353 – 0.241 0.258 – 0.342
b – 0.216 – 0.064 – 0.355 – 0.105
s 0 1 0 1
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In the case of a private demand shock (see table 2), fiscal policy alone is able to
stabilise the economy perfectly, without any variations in the interest rate nor the
exchange rate7. If policymakers do use monetary policy only, they have to reduce the
interest rate in order to depreciate the currency. This policy leads to higher inflation
and an improvement in the trade balance; both effects are more substantial if the
country is small. Hence, the variations of the interest and exchange rates will be
higher in a large country. The rise in the exchange rate volatility will help this
country to stabilise its economy in a more optimal way: its losses are smaller ex post.
In the case of an inflation shock (see table 3), the authorities of a large country
will raise their interest rate more than a small country’s; the appreciation of the
currency will be higher in the former. Unfortunately, the monetary instrument is less
powerful in the large country: the rise in the exchange rate reduces prices less the
more closed the country. Therefore, the exchange rate varies more in the large
country and its loss is bigger. If policymakers use fiscal policy, they will manage a
restrictive monetary policy (to curb inflation through an appreciation) and an
expansive fiscal policy (to bolster activity level). This policy strategy increases
exchange rates instability, especially in the large country, but it is rewarded by a
better stabilisation in terms of output and inflation.
In the case of a trade shock (see table 4), the big country has to depreciate its
currency more than the small one in order to curb its trade deficit. If both
policymakers intervene, a positive monetary policy and a restrictive fiscal policy
ought to be implemented: this will be costly because of the depreciation which will
be stronger the larger the country.
2. Demand shock: d = – 1 %
Large country n = 0,1 Small country n = 0,2
Initial
shock
Use of r Use of g
and r
Initial
shock
Use of r Use of g
and r
g 0 0 1 0 0 1
r 0 – 2.131 0 0 – 1.273 0
y – 1.569 – 0.231 0 – 1.290 – 0.387 0
q – 0.353 0.161 0 – 0.258 0.177 0
b 0.216 0.351 0 0.355 0.488 0
s 0 2.131 0 0 1.273 0
L 2.849 0.476 0 2.176 0.928 0
                                            
7 The rise in public expenditures compensates exactly and immediately the decrease in private demand.
Production is kept at the stationary-state level: the interest rate is constant since production, inflation and trade
balance are fixed.
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3. Supply shock: w = 1 %
Large country n = 0,1 Small country n = 0,2
Initial
shock
Use of r Use of g
and r
Initial
shock
Use of r Use of g
and r
g 0 0 0.425 0 0 0.131
r 0 0.456 1.363 0 0.206 0.373
y – 0.235 – 0.522 – 0.423 – 0.387 – 0.533 – 0.492
q 0.847 0.737 0.425 0.723 0.652 0.629
b – 0.118 – 0.147 – 0.296 – 0.194 – 0.215 – 0.279
s 0 – 0.456 – 1.363 0 – 0.206 – 0.373
L 1.532 1.423 1.336 1.306 1.274 1.258
4. Trade shock: b = – 1 %
Large country n = 0,1 Small country n = 0,2
Initial
shock
Use of r Use of g
and r
Initial
shock
Use of r Use of g
and r
g 0 0 – 1.219 0 0 – 0.579
r 0 – 2.499 – 5.091 0 – 1.681 – 2.418
y – 1.569 – 0.001 – 0.282 – 1.290 – 0.097 – 0.321
q – 0.353 0.250 0.446 – 0.258 0.317 0.419
b – 0.784 – 0.625 – 0.198 – 0.645 – 0.469 – 0.186
s 0 2.499 5.091 0 1.681 2.418
L 4.555 1.297 0.594 3.047 0.870 0.559
These first results confirm that the currency of a big country should show more
variability than a small country’s; this increased volatility is necessary to reduce the
consequences of various shocks. It also appears that a large country suffers relatively
less from the effects of a private demand shock because it can be smoothed by a
monetary policy; though, it is more affected by an inflation or a trade shock. A small
country is in a better position to reduce the effects of the two latter shocks by an
exchange rate modification. The Euro should be a relatively more volatile currency.
Ph. Martin (1997) considers the opposite result. According to him, « a large
country is less encouraged to use monetary policy in a strategic way in order to stabilise its
economy that a smaller country, because its production depends less on the exchange rate
than the small one. A large country should then have a more stable exchange rate than a small
country ». In Martin’s model, Purchasing Power Parity holds: when a country
depreciates its currency by 10%, it undergoes a price level increase of 10%, whatever
its size. Firms decide to produce in countries offering the smallest real wages. The
competitiveness improvement due to a devaluation is larger the smaller the country:
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if a country represents 1% of world production, its firms will make gains in
competitiveness over 99% of their external competitors. If it represents up to 50% of
world production, they will make gains over 50% only of their competitors. A small
open country tends therefore to devaluate its currency more often because its
production earnings are higher than a large country’s for the same cost in terms of
inflation.
His model can be rewritten very simply. Production is stronger the smaller the
real wage: y v t p w= - -( )( )1 0 , where t is the weight of the country in terms of world
production. Prices follow the exchange rate according to PPP, p s= , while nominal
wage is sticky in the short run. The loss function is: L y p= +² ²a .
The resulting minimisation gives: s w t v a t v= - + -0 1 1( )² ² / ( ( )² ²).
After a supply shock on w0 , the exchange rate moves the more the smaller t,
hence the smaller the country. If a= 1 and v = 1, s w if t ands w if t= = = =05 0 02 050 0. , . . .
Both models’ realism must be compared. Both state that devaluations have a
bigger impact on the goods market the smaller the country; the difference comes
from the impact on inflation: in our model, devaluation impinges more on prices in
the smaller country whereas inflation impacts are the same in Martin’s whatever the
degree of openness. We do think that this peculiarity makes Martin’s model less
realistic than ours: PPP does not hold empirically since a devaluating country does
not face an inflation whose magnitude is equivalent to that of the exchange rate
variation; furthermore, devaluation is more inflationary in a small open economy
than in a larger and more closed country.
Hence, the Euro ought to be more unstable than the past European currencies.
Our present approach has nevertheless at least two shortcomings8. On the one hand,
we ignore the reaction of the rest of the world: it is however substantial enough to
change results radically. This is all the more true as far as a large country is
concerned: it cannot use its interest rate without impinging on the rest of the world.
On the other hand, the nature of the shocks hitting the EU has not been precised: a
common shock has not the same consequences in terms of economic policy or
exchange rate variability as an idiosyncratic shock. We have to tackle these two
shortcomings; here is the reason for the building of a three-country model for the
USA, Germany and France.
Before turning to this issue, we shall consider two other cases in our preliminary
model. First, we show the macroeconomic influence of ECB’s independence. Second,
we study the impact of the Stability Pact.
                                            
8 A more fundamental criticism would say that the sources of the exchange rate volatility in our first
model are due essentially to the reactions of monetary policies to real shocks. This model does not discuss the
influence of the size effect on the occurrence of speculative shocks or shocks caused by the modifications in the
orientation of economic policies.
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ECB’s independence
EMU cannot be characterised by its size only. ECB’s independence as well as the
Stability Pact are factors involving new kinds of policy’s reactions. As a first step,
suppose that the ECB and European governments act freely and independently;
suppose further that ECB and the government have different targets: after an
inflation shock, the ECB wants to reduce it faster than governments. This situation
could end in a conflict between monetary and fiscal policies; interest rates and public
deficit would be high and the Euro would be overvalued (see Capoen, Sterdyniak
and Villa (1994)). ECB’s independence should then provoke Euro’s fluctuations.
5. Supply shock: w = 1 %
Large country n = 0,1
Centralised policies ECB’s independence
g 0.425 1.291
r 1.363 3.427
y – 0.423 – 0.361
q 0.425 0.476
b – 0.296 – 0.614
s – 1.363 – 3.427
L 1.336 1.726
LG 0.889 1.489
LM 1.783 1.943
Loss functions are : L y q bM M= + +2 2 2a b avec aM = 3
                                 L y q b avecG G G= + + =2 2 2 1a b a
These results are clarified in our model. We take the case of a large country
which suffers from a supply shock. In table 5, we present the situation in which
economic policy is being centralised (fiscal and monetary authorities minimise the
same loss function - equation (6)), and compare it with that of ECB’s independence.
In the latter case, we assume that the ECB is more reluctant to inflation than
governments. The inflation shock entails a conflict between the monetary authority,
which increases the interest rate to curb inflation, and governments which raise
public deficits to sustain the activity level. Ex post, the exchange rate appreciates
much and the trade balance shows a large deficit. All policymakers incur more
substantial losses than in the centralised case: they would rather bargain a decrease
in the interest rate for a lesser public deficit; anyway, none can improve its situation
without co-operation or centralisation. If these conditions cannot be met, EMU
should lead to higher volatility for the Euro.
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The Stability Pact
The Stability Pact may limit the use of fiscal policy. If this happens, monetary
policy will be exclusively responsible for macroeconomic stabilisation. We have
already shown that a negative private demand shock cannot be stabilised in an
optimal way if interest and exchange rates are fixed and fiscal policy is restricted
(see table 2). An active monetary policy is thus needed: it provokes a decrease in the
exchange rate. In fine, stabilisation is worse than with a fiscal policy, since
production falls and inflation soars.
A similar result arises after an increase in the foreign interest rate or a
speculative shock (see table 6): to restore output and inflation back to their initial
levels (what we call optimal stabilisation), the internal interest rate has to be raised
so that the exchange rate remains constant, and public deficit has to rise in order to
compensate for the output effects due to the higher interest rate. Without fiscal
policy, the increase in the internal interest rate will be weaker and the exchange rate
tends to depreciate: inflation goes up. In these two cases, the Stability Pact gives rise
to additional Euro’s volatility.
6. Increase in the foreign interest rate: r* = 1 %
Large country n = 0,1
Initial shock Use of r Use of g and r
g 0 0 0.25
r 0 0.467 1
y 0.235 0.058 0
q 0.153 0.040 0
b 0.118 0.088 0
s 1 0.533 0
L 0.144 0.030 0
However, results are reversed after supply shocks (see table 3): the optimal
strategy consists in increasing the interest rate, thus overvaluing the exchange rate,
to curb inflation. If restrictions on fiscal policy are imposed, monetary policy will be
slowed down by its negative impact on demand. On the other hand, if fiscal policy is
positive while monetary policy is restrictive, large variations in the interest rate and
then in the exchange rate occur. The degree of freedom of fiscal policy gives new
opportunities to monetary policy which can then be used more toughly: this permits
to reach a lower inflation rate. Trade deficit nonetheless falls more heavily. As a
conclusion, it is straightforward that limiting fiscal deficits will reduce exchange rate
fluctuations.
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The Dollar and the Euro
We will here consider a three-country model with the United States on the one
hand, and two European countries on the other hand, and compare three situations
depending on the exchange rate regime in Europe: flexible, EMS or EMU9. The
European countries represent France and Germany, hence a follower and a leader
country in the EMS. Equations in this model are identical to the first model’s (see box
1). For simplicity, we assume that the United States have a size of 200, while
Germany and France have a size of 100 each. Each of the bilateral exchanges is worth
10. The US degree of openness is then equal to 10%: the USA share the case of the
large country in our first model. Before any exchange rate agreement, the degree of
openness of Germany and France is equal to 20% for each: they are in the case of the
small country. In EMU, Europe becomes identical to the USA: the degree of
openness falls to 10%; the ECB and the Fed share the same loss function, and the
ECB is taking the average variations in Europe’s production and inflation into
account. We further assume that the ECB and European governments have the same
loss function. We have already shown that Euro’s volatility would be higher if the
ECB was more reluctant to inflation than governments. Last, we assume that each
authority minimises its loss function taking economic policy by other policymakers
as given: we limit our analysis to Nash equilibria10.
Symmetric shocks
We first study the consequences of symmetric shocks (they hit European
countries in the same way). In this context, the EMS and the EMU are perfectly
identical. The Bundesbank manages its interest rate according only to the German
economic activity but, after a symmetric shock, the German economic situation is
equal to the European average situation11. The Bundesbank’s reaction function
depends also on its perceiving the influence of its policy; in the EMS, if the
Bundesbank is managed by rational bankers, they have to keep in mind that an
increase in German rates will be followed by an increase in European rates so that
intra-European exchange rates remain at their initial levels12. The impact of a rise in
German interest rates on Germany is the same as a rise in European interest rates on
the whole EU. Hence, as far as we are concerned with symmetric shocks, EMU’s
functioning will be exactly identical to that of the EMS13.
                                            
9 We use a method developed by Sterdyniak and Villa (1993, a). It is assumed that European countries and
the USA have flexible exchange rates one with the other.
10 Co-operative behaviour in Europe are dealt with in Sterdyniak and Villa (1993, a) and Capoen et al.
(1994).
11 As an approximation, we assume that all European countries are functioning the same way.
12 We here assume that the Bundesbank has never had as an objective an exchange rate crisis in the EMS.
13 At least identical to the « ard EMS » between Germany, Austria, Benelux, Denmark and France.
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After a negative demand shock in EMU14, the ECB decreases its interest rate
trading off between a boost in production and a positive impact on inflation and
trade balance (see table 7). At stationary state, Europe undergoes a lower production
level, a higher inflation and an increased trade surplus. If European countries are in
flexible exchange rates, national central banks overestimate the relative influence of
the interest rate on prices and trade balance. Interest rates will then be higher than in
EMU to curb inflation and compensate for the trade surplus: the interest rate
decreases finally less than in EMU. As a conclusion, equilibrium is better in EMU
than in flexible exchange rates despite higher variations of the Euro/Dollar parity.
Note however that the gap between both equilibria is very thin. This is due to the
fact that in both cases, European reaction functions are almost similar: they have the
same determinants with the same signs; they only differ by their coefficients values.
The additional volatility is thus very weak15.
7. Demand shock in France and Germany*
Initial shock Flexible rate EMU or EMS
G & F USA G & F USA G & F USA
r 0 0 – 2.618 – 1.296 – 2.687 – 1.313
y – 1.645 – 0.355 – 0.198 0.154 – 0.158 0.158
q – 0.379 – 0.121 0.092 – 0.102 0.106 – 0.106
b 0.177 – 0.177 0.247 – 0.247 0.249 – 0.249
s 0 1.322 1.374
L 3.088 0.250 0.238 0.227 0.234 0.234
* A demand shock in the USA gives symmetric results..
After a symmetric supply shock in Europe, European countries increase their
interest rates, hence appreciating their currencies. In the EMU, inflation arises and
production decreases. With flexible exchange rates, these countries still overestimate
the relative impact of interest rates on inflation: accordingly, interest rates are raised
too heavily and give rise to a larger appreciation than in the EMU. The
macroeconomic equilibrium in European countries is slightly better in EMU than in
flexible exchange rates: exchange rates vary less (see table 8). Let us suppose now
that the supply shock occurs in the USA; the Fed raises its interest rate toughly while
European countries do the same but slightly. The Euro depreciates in comparison
with the Dollar. As was the case earlier, European countries increase interest rates
more in flexible exchange rates than in the EMU. Hence, EMU is characterised in this
context by a more substantial exchange rate volatility than in the flexible exchange
                                            
14 We assume that the fiscal policy is not active otherwise it would perfectly stabilise the economy without
any parity change.
15 We find similar results after a speculative shock.
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rate regime (recall that the Fed has raised its interest rate). Despite this higher
volatility, EMU remains the better regime for European countries: losses are smaller
than in the situation with European flexible exchange rates.
8. Supply shock in France and Germany; monetary policy reactions only
Initial shock* Flexible rate* EMU or EMS Flexible rate**
G & F USA G & F USA G & F USA G & F USA
r 0 0 0.87 0.63 0.70 0.60 0.63 0.71
y – 0.19 0.19 – 0.65 – 0.10 – 0.55 – 0.09 – 0.11 – 0.56
q 0.86 0.14 0.72 0.09 0.76 0.08 0.07 0.76
b – 0.10 0.10 – 0.11 0.11 – 0.10 0.10 0.10 – 0.10
s 0 – 0.235 – 0.109 0.081
L 1.549 0.104 1.519 0.060 1.501 0.051 0.053 1.507
* A supply shock in the USA gives symmetric results.
** Supply shock in the USA.
These results are not modified if governments use fiscal policy (see table 9).
After a supply shock in Europe, the strong reaction of European central banks in
flexible exchange rates entails a very active fiscal policy. The appreciation of
European currencies vis-à-vis Dollar is larger than in the EMU. In this case, however,
the ‘impact illusion’ of European policymakers is useful: they reach a better
equilibrium in flexible exchange rates, where they ignore that their European
partners manage the same monetary policy, than in the EMU or the EMS where they
take partners’ reactions into account. Tougher appreciation in this situation help to
curb inflation.
9. Supply shock; monetary and fiscal reactions
Shock in A & F Shock in USA
Flexible rate EMU Flexible rate EMU
G & F USA G & F USA G & F USA G & F USA
g 0.98 0.66 0.66 0.43 0.30 0.28 0.59 0.50
r 4.10 3.42 2.88 2.39 1.56 1.58 2.63 2.53
y – 0.47 – 0.01 – 0.45 – 0.10 – 0.02 – 0.42 – 0.02 – 0.42
q 0.73 0.16 0.75 0.14 0.10 0.80 0.08 0.82
b – 0.19 0.19 – 0.16 0.16 0.09 – 0.09 0.10 – 0.10
s – 0.68 – 0.50 0.02 – 0.10
L 1.381 0.155 1.405 0.117 0.045 1.494 0.031 1.525
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As a conclusion, higher Euro’s volatility occurs actually after supply shocks in
the USA and, more slightly, after demand shock in Europe. This result is reversed if
supply shocks hit Europe.
Despite the differences in the model and loss functions, we reach the same
results as Benassy et al. (1997). It is worth noting that Cohen (1997)16 finds the exactly
opposite result: EMU would reduce volatility after a demand shock and increase it
after a supply shock. We explain this apparent contradiction in box 2. In short,
Benassy et al. and us assume that prices elasticity for intra-European trade is equal to
that of extra-European trade. Cohen, on the other hand, suppose with much
relevance that trade among European countries rests on homogeneous products
which are more sensitive to relative prices than trade with non-European partners
which rests on goods that are not produced in the EU (oil, coffee...). Unfortunately,
Cohen neglects the influence of interest rates on aggregate demand. If we take
Cohen’s assumption into account and suppose that interest rates impinge on
demand, we are faced with a difficult problem: it is now impossible to dress any
conclusion on the more or less volatility induced by symmetric supply and demand
shocks in the EMU in comparison with flexible exchange rates. It might well be that
no difference in volatility occurs; if it nonetheless happens, its direction is
indeterminate.
                                            
16 His article has the drawback that monetary policy controls the inflation rate directly, without expliciting
the links between monetary policy’s instruments (interest rates) and its final target (inflation). His assumption
prevents him from realising that he thus explictly assumes that interest rates have no impact on demand.
Furthermore, Sterdyniak and Villa (1993, b) have shown that Nash equilibrium crucially depends on the way
economic control variables are described.
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Box 2: An explicit solution
In order to get sure of the robustness of our results and to compare these with other
specifications, we give here the explicit solutions to our simple model. We assume that the loss
function depends only on production and inflation: L y q= +2 2a . Policymakers use only monetary
policy.
In the case of a single country in the open economy, the model becomes:
y u s w d q vs w= - + = +( ) ; . Hence:
(7) s Ad Bw withA
u
u v
and B
v u
u v
= - - =
+
=
-
+
: 2 2
2
2 2a
a
a
n is the degree of openness of the country; if v nandu n= = +d s , ( )A
n
n n
=
+
+ +
d s
d s a2 2
A is always a decreasing function of n. After a demand shock, the exchange rate varies the more
the smaller n, hence the larger the country. If the effect of the interest rate on domestic demand is
small in comparison with the competitive effects (s small in comparison with nd), A is proportional
to the reverse of n: the exchange rate varies like the inverse of the degree of openness.
B is positive (i.e., after an inflation shock, authorities appreciate the currency to curb inflation) if
n na d s> +( )², i.e. if policymakers are highly reluctant to inflation. This is the case in our model. B is
negative if authorities prefer to stabilise production rather than inflation: they thus depreciate their
currency to compensate for the loss in competitiveness.
In the case of two European countries, we will limit our analysis here to symmetric shocks and
will neglect, as a first approximation, the Fed reaction. u and v are effective coefficients; u* and v* are
the coefficients in flexible exchange rates as perceived by monetary authorities which do not consider
that the central bank of the other European country acts as well. We obtain: v n v n n= = +; * * ,
where n is the degree of openness towards out-of-the-EU countries and n* is the degree of openness
towards EU countries. Further: u n u n n= + = + +d s d d s; * * * , where d is price elasticity for extra-
EU trade, and d* is price elasticity for intra-EU trade.
In the EMU, reaction of the exchange rate is always given by (7).
With flexible exchange rates, it is such that:
(8) s A d B w with A
u
uu vv
and B
v uu
uu vv
= - - =
+
=
-
+
* * *
*
* *
*
* *
* *a
a
a
After a demand shock, the exchange rate reaction in the EMU is larger if A A> * , hence, if
uv u v* *> , i.e. if:
(9) n nd s d+ > *
This inequality is at the heart of the differences of results between Benassy et al.’s (1997) and our
model, on the one hand, and Cohen’s (1997), on the other hand. Benassy et al. and us have not
distinguished between intra- and extra-EU trade price elasticities; we have then assumed that
d d= * . Inequality (9) compulsorily holds: exchange rates fluctuate more in the EMU. Cohen states
with great relevance that d d* > : for example, France imports from EU countries goods that French
firms also produce, but it largely imports from extra-EU countries raw materials which are not
substitutable to other French productions. Unfortunately, Cohen assumes that monetary policy
manages the exchange rate but not the interest rate: he a priori states that s = 0. After a demand
shock, it comes quite easily that the exchange rate fluctuates less in the EMU than in a flexible
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regime. If the idea of Cohen according to which d d* >  is introduced as well as s > 0, both effects go
in opposite directions. It is
no more possible to say that volatility is higher in the EMU or with flexible exchange rates. Volatility
can be similar in both regimes.
After a supply shock, two situations should be distinguished. If B > 0, the exchange rate
reaction in the EMU is larger if B B> * , hence if uv u v* *< ; this is the opposite of the previous
condition. Volatility is reduced after a supply shock if it is increased after a demand shock (Benassy’s
and our case); it is larger after a supply shock if it is smaller after a demand shock (Cohen’s model). If
B < 0, the exchange rate reaction in the EMU is larger if uv u v* *> , hence if condition (9) holds. In
this case, the variation in the exchange rate volatility after EMU’s enforcement will be similar
whatever the shock.
Idiosyncratic shocks
We now analyse asymmetric shocks17. Here, flexible exchange rates display a
great advantage: each country is able to run the policy which is relevant to its
economic situation. On the contrary, in the EMS, Germany imposes a monetary
policy whose stringency or smoothness is just relevant to its internal economic
context. In the EMU, monetary policy corresponds to the average European
situation.
We first consider the case of a demand shock in France (see table 10). A positive
fiscal policy by French government could stabilise the three economies completely.
We will however suppose that fiscal policies are totally impeded by the Stability
Pact. In flexible exchange rates, France’s monetary authorities reduce their interest
rate very toughly; the Bundesbank slightly; the Fed more slightly. There occurs a
strong depreciation of the Franc/Dollar exchange rate ; the DM depreciates also, to a
lesser extent. In the EMU, the decrease in the interest rate is intermediate between
France’s and Germany’s in flexible exchange rates, but it is weakly superior to their
average: the Euro’s depreciation is consequently intermediate between France’s and
Germany’s in flexible exchange rates. Though, loss functions in France and Germany
give worse results in EMU than in a flexible exchange rates regime: both countries
have to adapt to an « average » monetary policy which is relevant to none of them.
                                            
17 Benassy et al. (1997) and Cohen (1997) do study anti-symmetric shocks only: a country undergoes a
positive shock while the second suffers from a negative shock of the same size. We do not understand what
would justify such shocks, unless German workers accept lower wages, for example, at the same time as French
workers would get higher wages!
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10. Demand shock in France
Initial shock Flexible rate* EMU* EMS shock in France EMS Shock in Germany
F G USA F G USA F G USA F G USA F G USA
r 0 – 1.74 – 0.88 – 0.65 – 1.34 – 1.34 – 0.66 – 0.61 – 0.61 – 0.47 – 2.08 – 2.08 – 0.84
y – 1.37 – 0.28 – 0.18 – 0.32 0.12 0.08 – 0.63 – 0.47 0.08 – 1.05 0.04 0.04 0.90 – 0.20 0.12
q – 0.29 – 0.09 – 0.06 0.14 – 0.05 – 0.05 – 0.04 – 0.15 – 0.05 – 0.19 – 0.00 – 0.10 0.30 0.11 – 0.89
b 0.32 – 0.14 – 0.09 0.41 – 0.16 – 0.12 0.35 – 0.10 – 0.12 0.32 – 0.13 – 0.10 – 0.07 0.38 – 0.15
s 0 1.095 0.227 0.687 0.687 0.137 0.137 1.237 1.237
L 2.338 0.150 0.250 0.635 0.095 0.057 0.766 0.295 0.058 1.497 0.053 0.030 1.237 0.496 0.100
* A demand shock in Germany gives symmetric results.
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After an idiosyncratic shock, EMU is no more equivalent to the EMS. How does
a shock impinge on the three economies when two are in the EMS? Suppose first that
the shock hits France, whose monetary policy is following the Bundesbank’s: the
decrease in interest rates comes from the latter central bank who reacts according to
the German situation; this reduction is too weak for French economy. In this case,
EMS is the worst exchange rate regime for France, the best for Germany. Suppose
now that Germany suffers directly from the shock: this time, the reduction in
German interest rates is too large for France. Hence, if demand shocks hit only
Germany (resp. France), Euro’s volatility is higher (resp. weaker) in the EMU than in
the EMS. If demand shocks hit both countries one after the other with the same
frequency, volatility is the same: in such a case, the best exchange rate regime for
France is flexible exchange rate, then EMU. EMS is the worst. The best regime for
Germany is the EMS, then flexible exchange rate. EMU is the worst.
11. Trade shock in Europe
Initial
shock*
Flexible
rate*
EMU* EMS
F F F F G USA
r 0 – 1.22 0 1.88 1.88 0.48
y – 1.10 – 0.16 – 1.10 – 2.19 0.01 – 0.09
q – 0.19 0.34 – 0.19 – 0.58 – 0.20 0.09
b – 0.55 0.38 – 0.55 – 0.62 0.47 0.07
s 0 1.22 0 – 1.40 – 1.40
L 2.175 0.699 2.175 6.61 0.75 0.04
* the situation in Germany is symmetric; the USA are not affected.
Last, suppose that a trade shock occurs in Europe; it takes the form of demand
transfer between the two European countries: French trade deficit and German trade
surplus increase (see table 11). With flexible exchange rates, the Banque de France
lowers its interest rate while the Bundesbank augments his. The Franc depreciates in
comparison with the Dollar while the DM appreciates. This reduces the trade gap
and help to stabilise production. In the EMU, the ECB is crippled. Euro is stable, but
both countries face worse situations. EMS is still the worst regime for France: as the
Bundesbank increases its interest rate, the Banque de France is compelled to follow
so that European currencies appreciate largely. As far as France is concerned, EMU
will be preferred to the EMS; it is nonetheless worse than flexible exchange rates.
EMU can reduce exchange rate volatility.
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Mixed results
Should we fear that Euro’s introduction increase exchange rate volatility on a
world-wide basis? Our paper offers mixed results. Additional Euro’s volatility
occurs only in the case of demand shock or external supply shocks; it is relatively
weak in both however. On the other hand, internal supply shocks cause a distinct
reduction in volatility. This array of results can be inverted if intra-European trade
sensitiveness to relative prices is particularly strong. In cases of common shocks in
Europe, it must be noted that the additional volatility goes together with more
optimal economic stabilisation. This volatility should have been moreover observed
in the EMS. As for idiosyncratic shocks, the Euro is more stable that the currency of
the hit country; this relative stability is reached at the expense of economic
stabilisation. The ECB’s independence could however lead to large swings in the
Euro value after inflation shocks if monetary and fiscal policies do not share the
same targets. Last, limits on fiscal policy in accordance with the Stability Pact can
make more active monetary policies necessary: this is a source for increased
volatility of the Euro.
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Appendix
Compared exchange rate volatility: empirical evidence
The volatility’s concept can be defined and measured according to different
methods18. We will limit our study to two indicators: first, standard deviations for
variations in monthly exchange rates19 which give information on the short-term
volatility of nominal exchange rates; second, real exchange rates deviations from
their average values which reflect long-lasting exchange rates misadjustments.
Since 1972, numerous exchange rate regimes have been tried in Europe; each
corresponded to successive EMS steps. The exchange rate mechanism (ERM) is
created in March 1979. It is reinforced in March 1983: realignments are no longer
automatically accepted and they do not compensate exactly for inflation
differentials. Since September 1987, EMS has been strengthened by intra-marginal
intervention mechanisms for central banks, by the admission of the Lira in the
narrow margins and by the new membership of Portugal, Spain and United
Kingdom. The target for long-lasting pegs is explicitly declared. Since September
1992, EMS has been suffering from sand in the wheels of its functioning: speculative
attacks in 1992-93, the Sterling’s and Lira’s exit from the ERM, and the enlargement
of margins in August 1993 are highly significant. EMS has finally reinforced because
of the increased credibility of the Single Currency’s introduction.
An indicator for volatility
Standard deviations for monthly variations in nominal exchange rates expressed
in DM (see table A1) show without any surprise a tough fall in exchange rate
volatility between EMS members. Between 1974-79 and 1987-92 periods, volatility is
reduced by 76% between the DM and the Franc and by almost 78% between the Lira
and the DM. The admission of the Sterling in the ERM has reduced its volatility vis-
à-vis the DM by 63%. On the contrary, exit from the EMS or introduction of larger
margins bring volatility back to their seventies’ levels.
                                            
18 See IMF (1984), Artis and Taylor (1988), Bartolini and Bodnar (1996), and a recent application of
ARCH methodology by Tse (1998).
19 We will not deal with the « leptokurtic » exchange rate distribution (see Artis and Taylor (1988) or
Pesaran and Robinson (1993)). In general, such a specificity disappears when monthly or quarterly exchange
rates are studied.
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A1. Standard deviations of monthly variations in exchange rates expressed in
DM
Japan Greece UK Sweden France Italy
1974 :8-79 :2 2.30 1.67 2.13 1.55 1.65 2.47
1979 :3-83 :2 3.00 2.60 2.51 2.77 0.99 1.01
1983 :3-87 :8 2.07 2.50 2.35 1.16 0.75 0.81
1987 :9-92 :8 2.38 0.73 1.47 0.93 0.39 0.55
1992 :9-97 :11 2.78 1.00 2.31 2.45 0.69 2.69
Source : Eurostat (monthly data), authors’ calculations.
Examination of the respective exchange rate volatility between large countries or
between a large and a smaller non-EMS country gives nonetheless mixed results.
Volatility of the DM/Dollar exchange rate has certainly been higher the stronger the
EMS, but the deviations from the Yen-Dollar volatility are very weak and impede
clear-cut conclusions (see table A2). The Sterling-Dollar parity is only slightly less
volatile (out of periods where the Sterling joined the ERM) than the Dollar-DM
exchange rate. On the contrary, the Swedish Crone and the Greek Drachma have
benefited from a substantial fall in their respective volatility towards the DM; these
reductions reached their trough during the most stable stage of the EMS. Volatility of
those two currencies diverge however between 1992 and 1997: the Drachma remains
relatively stable, whereas the Crone fluctuates largely in part because monetary
authorities used the exchange rate actively as an economic policy’s instrument.
A2. Standard deviations of monthly variations in exchange rates
 expressed in US$
Germany Japan UK France Italy
1974 :8-79 :2 2.08 2.17 2.11 1.93 2.22
1979 :3-83 :2 2.84 3.25 2.61 2.96 2.60
1983 :3-87 :8 2.97 2.82 2.89 2.92 2.6 3
1987 :9-92 :8 3.00 2.75 3.02 2.86 2.71
1992 :9-97 :11 2.40 2.89 2.61 2.22 2.77
Source : Eurostat (monthly data), authors’ calculations..
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An indicator of misadjustment
To evaluate long-lasting deviations of the real exchange rates, we compare the
evolution of nominal exchange rates and that of relative prices. The tested equations
runs:
log( ) log/s T
P
Pa b
a
b
= + +
æ
è
ç
ö
ø
÷a a0 1
where s is the nominal exchange rate between country a and country b; T is time;
and P are consumer price indexes.
Two points are clear (see table A3 and graphics). First, EMS has reduced sharply
real exchange rates deviations in comparison with the flexible exchange rates. As is
shown in the comparison between the Franc-DM and Sterling-DM parities, nominal
exchange rate flexibility brings in more intrinsic volatility than it compensates for
prices differentials. Real exchange rate fluctuations between large countries are very
sizeable and higher than those between a large and a smaller country: the DM-Dollar
and Yen-Dollar parities show larger and more long-lasting misadjustment phases
than the Drachma-DM or Crone-DM exchange rates. This tends to confirm the
positive impact of country size on exchange rate volatility.
A3. Standard deviations of the residuals in percentage of the mean of the
exchange rate
DM/$ Yen/$ Crone/
DM
Drachma
/
DM
FF/DM £/DM
s 17.4 % 15.9 % 8.4 % 6.4 % 3.8 % 13.3 %
Source : authors’ calculations..
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G1. DM/$ exchange rate
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N.B.: the exchange rate is in black, its estimation in grey.
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 G4. Drachma/DM exchange rate
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10. Demand shock in France
Initial shock Flexible rate* EMU* EMS shock in France EMS Shock in Germany
F G USA F G USA F G USA F G USA F G USA
r 0 – 1.74 – 0.88 – 0.65 – 1.34 – 1.34 – 0.66 – 0.61 – 0.61 – 0.47 – 2.08 – 2.08 – 0.84
y – 1.37 – 0.28 – 0.18 – 0.32 0.12 0.08 – 0.63 – 0.47 0.08 – 1.05 0.04 0.04 0.90 – 0.20 0.12
q – 0.29 – 0.09 – 0.06 0.14 – 0.05 – 0.05 – 0.04 – 0.15 – 0.05 – 0.19 – 0.00 – 0.10 0.30 0.11 – 0.89
b 0.32 – 0.14 – 0.09 0.41 – 0.16 – 0.12 0.35 – 0.10 – 0.12 0.32 – 0.13 – 0.10 – 0.07 0.38 – 0.15
s 0 1.095 0.227 0.687 0.687 0.137 0.137 1.237 1.237
L 2.338 0.150 0.250 0.635 0.095 0.057 0.766 0.295 0.058 1.497 0.053 0.030 1.237 0.496 0.100
* A demand shock in Germany gives symmetric results.
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